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FOREWORD
During large-scale emergencies or disasters, National Guard forces regularly operate alongside Active
Component forces in response to requests from civil
authorities. In an attempt to promote unity of effort
between state-controlled National Guard and Active
Component forces, states and the Department of Defense agreed to use dual status commanders—military
commanders authorized by law to serve in both state
and federal statuses simultaneously—as the primary
command and control mechanism during unplanned
incident response operations. This unique command
arrangement was used for the first time in response
to an unplanned incident during Hurricane Sandy in
October 2012. Though the arrangement worked well
in many ways, there are definitely opportunities for
improvement.
Using their recent Strategic Studies Institute study
evaluating the use of dual status commanders during
Hurricane Sandy, Mr. Ryan Burke and Professor Sue
McNeil offer suggestions to mature dual status commander operations through the application of process
improvement concepts. They take a unique approach
to their analysis and propose a series of examples and
recommendations intended to illustrate a new way of
both diagnosing and improving operational performance during these complex missions.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The role of the military during homeland defense
and civil support operations has significant strategic implications for U.S. national security efforts.
Considerations for the future employment of Active
Component forces during missions in the homeland have evolved into a major topic of conversation
among policymakers and military strategists alike. In
this context, there is a philosophical conflict between
federalism and state sovereignty that continues to
present itself as an impediment to success. Balancing
the institutionally divergent approaches to achieve a
unified, efficient, and effective response continues to
prove problematic. The dual status commander (DSC)
initiative offers a coordination mechanism intended to
address the challenges of unity of effort between state
and federal military response activities. However,
there are numerous gaps in the available DSC guidance, which leads to increased complexity and confusion during domestic disaster response.
This monograph introduces process improvement
strategies focusing on the DSC construct in New York
during Hurricane Sandy. It builds on our previous
Strategic Studies Institute monograph documenting
the DSC-led response to Hurricane Sandy in New
York. Using the data collected during the Sandy case
study as a basis for analysis, the monograph discusses
the potential role of process improvement techniques
as a method for improving unity of effort between
state and federal military forces under the DSC construct for no-notice/limited-notice incident response.
As part of our argument, we assess the application
and utility of various process improvement methods and present examples of how such methods can
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be used to improve civil support missions. Based on
the recommendations from the Sandy case study, we
conclude by presenting a brief description of three
conceptual process models mapped to specific challenges of a DSC-led joint task force. These process
models identify essential tasks and key requirements
specific to a key process during a DSC operation. In
doing so, the models provide examples—not fully developed models—of alternative methods to guide the
progression of operational maturity during domestic
disaster response. As such, organizations like the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Army North, and U.S.
Northern Command should consider integrating process improvement concepts and techniques into future
DSC doctrine, policies, guidance, and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures. Using the concepts
presented here as a method for improvement, we argue, will provide a practical tool for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of this critical coordination
mechanism well into the future.

x

MATURING DEFENSE SUPPORT
OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
AND THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER
ARRANGEMENT
THROUGH THE LENS OF PROCESS
IMPROVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Combat operations require swift decisionmaking,
often with less information than is necessary to make
an informed decision. For these reasons, military commanders and planners regularly rehearse, train, exercise, and simulate combat scenarios so they are better
prepared to face such challenges in real-world situations. However, the U.S. military has an additional
mission capability that regularly requires a similar
sense of urgency to combat operations. Civil support
operations in response to emergencies or disasters,
while mostly lacking the inherent dangers of combat,
present an equally challenging operational environment full of legal, financial, and even political barriers
unique only to domestic missions.
Known as Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA), the U.S. military’s domestic disaster response
capability is robust. During incidents of great magnitude or duration, when local and state authorities are
overwhelmed or unable to respond as needed, civil
authorities sometimes request assistance from the Department of Defense (DoD). These DSCA operations
span a wide range of scenarios, including response to
natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances,
terrorism, and other significant incidents. In the early
stages of response operations, lives and property can
be at risk, often requiring swift decisionmaking with
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limited information, similar to combat operations.
However, while combat operations must be undertaken with consideration for the defined rules of engagement and laws of war, these are less restrictive, arguably, than the laws and policies governing the actions
of U.S. military forces in a domestic capacity.
DSCA operations occur within a complex web of
local, state, and federal laws, policies, and regulations,
many of which are rooted in the founding principles
of this nation and its rich history. DSCA presents a
challenging operational environment for military
leaders requiring effective navigation of the aforementioned laws, policies, and in some cases, politics.
While military leaders value the ability to maintain a
flexible, adaptive, and agile response capability, there
are, for better or worse, bureaucratic obstacles in the
form of processes and procedures that must be considered when operating domestically in support of lead
Federal civil authorities. As an added challenge, the
incidents requiring Federal military assistance typically involve state and federal military responses from
National Guard forces and Active Component forces.
Despite similar operational capabilities, state National
Guard forces and Active Component forces operate
under distinctly different sets of laws and policies,
which only serve to further complicate an already
difficult mission.
Throughout recent history, we have seen some of
the challenges faced by National Guard and Active
Component forces supporting civil authorities simultaneously. In 2004, during the G-8 Summit in Sea Island,
Georgia, DoD and the states adapted a new command
mechanism originally designed for blended units to
improve unity of effort between National Guard and
Active Component forces supporting civil authorities.
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Six years later, the Council of Governors facilitated a
solution to a long-standing debate between state governors and DoD over domestic command and control
of the Armed Forces when operating in their states:
The governors and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
agreed to utilize the dual status commander (DSC)
for disaster responses. In addition, the governors
and the SECDEF agreed to propose legislative language in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) codifying in law that the establishment of a
dual status commander is the “usual and customary”
command and control arrangement during the simultaneous employment of National Guard and Active
Component forces in disaster response scenarios.1 A
DSC is a “military commander who may, in accordance with the law, serve in two statuses, Federal and
State, simultaneously while performing the duties of
those statuses separately and distinctly.”2 Principally
designed as an enhanced unity of effort mechanism,
the DSC construct allows a single military commander
to command both National Guard forces on behalf of
a Governor, and Active Component forces on behalf
of the President, the SECDEF, and a supported Combatant Commander, when both are supporting civil
authorities simultaneously.
This unique command arrangement has been used
successfully since 2004 for planned national security
special events such as national political conventions,
international presidential summits, and the 2013 Super Bowl.3 However, Hurricane Sandy in October 2012
was the first use of National Guard and Active Component forces working under a DSC for a no-notice/
limited-notice4 incident.5 Sandy provided our first opportunity to witness the DSC construct in action during an unplanned response effort. As expected, there
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were several successes with this first time implementation that, in the minds of some, validated the concept
and encouraged future use.6 Conversely, the response
experienced some notable challenges.
Each of the Armed Services have systematic ways
of capturing lessons learned from training and operations in order to build on the past and improve operations in the future. These Lessons Learned programs
are quite valuable. They offer insight to their respective
service components to help improve future mission
performance through concept and doctrinal changes
and recommendations. Sometimes, however, these
recommendations and changes are not integrated into
future operations due to an ill-defined, or ineffective,
method of doing so. Without a defined method to
integrate these recommendations, there is no way to
promote consistent and continuous improvement of
these complex operational processes. There is a need,
then, to develop a tool or method that can be used to
consolidate recommended best practices into usable
models able to guide future operational decisionmaking. One approach worth considering is to apply
process improvement strategies to the complexities of
DSCA in order to develop a model to improve DSC
operations.7
Whereas military operations lack structured improvement methods, defense contracting and similar
DoD business operations regularly employ process
improvement strategies as a way to enhance their operational performance and accountability. Process improvement strategies are structured methods to assess
processes in terms of both strengths and weaknesses.
These strategies also guide users by helping them
chart a path for addressing issues while preserving
desirable qualities of a given process or system. Most
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process improvement strategies engage stakeholders
and develop supporting documentation for accountability. With its rich history of research literature supporting its use and application within software engineering, software development, manufacturing, and
business operations, process improvement is a proven
approach to enhance and mature complex operations.8
DoD currently uses structured process improvement
techniques and methods in a range of functions as a
way to monitor performance, identify areas of weakness, and steer improvement efforts toward performance enhancement and maturity.
While there are different approaches, in their most
basic form, process improvement techniques focus on
reducing waste and improving productivity through
the identification and performance of consistent, repeatable, and predictable practices. By deconstructing
complex processes into individual and related practices or actions, process improvement offers users a
tool for modeling the complexities of their processes
into workable goals and practices. Given the potential
utility of process improvement coupled with the inherent complexities of DSCA operations under a dual
status commander, these same process improvement
techniques currently used and endorsed by DoD in
nonoperational department activities can provide an
ideal platform to launch a structured improvement
plan aimed at maturing complex civil support operations under the DSC construct.
COMPLEXITIES OF CIVIL SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
The framers of the U.S. Constitution wrote it in such
a way as to deter or restrict a single governing body
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from exercising unregulated control over its constituents. Whereas the 18th century English government
used the military as a means of power projection over
its citizenry, the architects of the Constitution, having
declared their independence from an overriding governing body, sought to avoid similar abuse of governmental powers. As a result, the Constitution embraces
a federalist construct with language articulating the
separation of powers between three branches of government and shared powers with individual states.
Per Article X of the Constitution, any such powers
not given to the federal government under the Constitution are reserved to the states. Some of the key
language in this regard outlines the powers and limitations governing the role of the military in domestic
operations. As the supreme law of the United States,
these constitutional authorities and restrictions must
be understood as they provide the very foundation for
the use of military forces on domestic soil. Such limitations and restrictions also serve to complicate domestic military operations by entrenching command
decisionmaking in a complex set of laws, policies, and
formal regulations, each of which must be considered
during the conduct of DSCA and National Guard support to civil authorities.
Under the federalist construct, states and the federal government are divided but share certain powers
and authority. Among the many divisions of power
and authority, the role of the military in domestic capacities is one of the most significant. The Constitution
provides the basis for governing domestic state and
federal military actions. It gives powers to the states to
maintain a militia, or National Guard.9 It also allows
the President to call state militias into federal service
under specific circumstances.10 These declarations are
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upheld by specific laws in the U.S. Code and ensure
a clear and distinct military line of authority between
the states and the national government. Other laws
further regulate domestic military action and must be
considered during civil support operations.
The Posse Comitatus Act specifically prohibits
the Armed Forces from performing law enforcement
activities on domestic soil, unless specifically authorized by Congress (e.g., supporting the Department of
Justice in emergency situations involving weapons of
mass destruction pursuant to section 382 of title 10,
U.S. Code). However, this law does not apply to National Guard forces in State Active Duty or Title 32,
U.S. Code (state controlled; federally funded), status.
The Insurrection Act of 1807, however, authorizes the
President to deploy the Armed Forces in a law enforcement capacity within the United States in order
to suppress an insurrection, rebellion, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, or to repel
an invasion. The Insurrection Act also authorizes the
President to deploy the National Guard in a federal
status in a similar manner. Beyond these notable laws,
several additional laws and numerous other policies
and regulatory guidelines also influence domestic
military operations. Simply put, domestic Federal
military actions are governed by a complex series of
laws, policies, and procedures that often contribute to
inefficient and ineffective operations during times of
critical need.
In recent years, the DSC concept has generated
legislative and political momentum and has become
the usual and customary command and control
mechanism for simultaneous military state and federal response missions. Hurricane Sandy was the first
opportunity to see the DSC concept used in response
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to a no-notice/limited-notice incident. The operation
demonstrated some notable successes, but also encountered numerous challenges that process improvement techniques can help to address.
HURRICANE SANDY AND THE DUAL
STATUS COMMANDER
Hurricane Sandy made landfall near Brigantine,
NJ, at approximately 11:30 p.m. on October 29, 2012.11
In response to governors’ requests, the DoD approved
DSC authorizations for several states along the east
coast. Of the five states authorized to use DSCs, only
two DSCs were activated—New York and New Jersey—to command National Guard and Active military responders.12 Despite successful efforts to use a
DSC during planned operations since 2004, as well as
its recent adoption in the 2012 NDAA, the DSC had
not been used during an unplanned disaster response
prior to Hurricane Sandy.13 Both successes and previously anticipated areas of weakness marked the
inaugural employment of the DSC construct during
an unplanned incident. A report by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) on October 26, 2012—10
months after the approval of the 2012 NDAA and 4
days before Hurricane Sandy’s landfall—addressed
the notable gaps in homeland defense and civil support guidance with specific emphasis on the need
to address dual status commander policies and
procedures:
gaps in guidance remain because DOD has not yet
developed comprehensive policies and procedures
regarding the use and availability of dual-status commanders, including specific criteria and conditions for
when and how a state governor and the Secretary of
8

Defense would mutually appoint a commander. . . . As
a result, DOD’s ability to adequately prepare for and
effectively use dual-status commanders for a range of
civil support events, including those affecting multiple states, may be hindered.14

As if foreshadowing future events, GAO’s comments issued days prior to Sandy offered an accurate
prediction of the resulting state and federal military
responses under the dual status commander. While
there were several notable successes, the state and
federal military responses to Sandy experienced numerous challenges. Aside from the first use of a DSC
during an unplanned response, facilitating unity of effort between Active Component and National Guard
forces during the Sandy response required a multistate coordination effort unlike anything previously
encountered.15 This necessitated the establishment of a
temporary multiservice, multicomposition Joint Task
Force (JTF) in New York combining elements of the
Active Components (Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and
Air Force) and the National Guard (Army and Air). As
a result of the complex JTF structure during Sandy, the
DSC in New York dealt with coordination and communication issues, operational and tactical confusion,
and significant management challenges throughout
the duration of the 2-week response period.
As one of the many examples of confusion less
than a week into the response operation, the U.S. Marine Corps—at the request of a New York/New Jersey Port Authority official—deployed a detachment
of Marines to Staten Island unbeknownst to the NY
DSC.16 Since a civil authority specifically requested the
Marines to come ashore, this technically authorized
them to deploy without first informing the DSC or his
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staff.17 The Marines’ landing created confusion on the
part of the DSC. According to multiple DoD after action reports, tactical Active Component military commanders were not initially aware that a DSC had been
activated, nor did they know how to establish contact
with his staff.18 The tactical confusion among Active
Component military commanders points to the lack
of process guidance for such actions during DSC-led
responses. In addition, there were several additional
instances of confusion with regard to the mission
assignment process.
In order to approve a funded mission assignment
for Federal military support, requests for assistance
must originate from a lead Federal civil authority
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), which, in accordance with the Stafford Act,
acts on requests for support from a state. States request federal support from the lead federal agency
(LFA) for the particular operation. If necessary, the
LFA requests DoD support. DoD support, while inclusive of military force capability, is not limited to the
Armed Forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the Defense Logistics Agency can provide support, as
we saw during the Sandy response. Conceptually, this
bottom-up process ensures that officials use all available local and state resources (including the National
Guard) before requesting Federal support. In some
cases during Sandy, this process was not followed as
described. On November 2, for example, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) published a fragmentary order19 directing Active Component forces to:
• Get missions;
•	Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork;
and,
•	
Apply total force capabilities to accomplish
those missions.20
10

As part of most military operations, commanders
at all levels develop and issue operations orders detailing specific items relevant to a particular operation.
Most operational orders follow a basic five-paragraph
format and include such sections as situation, mission,
execution, administration/logistics, and communications. These orders provide the needed operational
guidance and intent to allow commanders at all levels
to guide their unit activities in a manner that contributes to the achievement of the tactical, operational, and
strategic objectives of the operation. Fluid and dynamic situations often require modifications to published
orders. In the case of Hurricane Sandy, NORTHCOM
issued the above fragmentary order in response to a
growing sense of urgency to integrate Federal military forces into the response operation. Normally, this
aggressive top-down approach would not present an
issue for a DSC. However, when military units provide response support outside of the command and
control of the DSC—as they did during Sandy—it creates coordination challenges. The resulting actions of
Active Component forces operating within the joint
operations area but external to the DSC’s command
and control, in this case led to increased confusion as
the DSC had no way of tracking the actions of some
Active Component forces.
If we use examples such as this and others that
occurred during Sandy, we can analyze the state and
federal military responses and develop a basis of
knowledge for improving future missions through
the lens of process improvement. Fortunately, there
are numerous lessons learned from which we can base
our future process improvement efforts.
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Post-Sandy Lessons Learned.
No matter the source, there is an apparent consensus across DoD that command, control, and management of forces presented one of the most challenging
aspects of the Sandy DSCA operation.21 Despite the
positive image portrayed in most media accounts of
the military’s role during the storm response, actual
military and government after action reports provide
more objective, self-critical assessments of performance. These documents highlight the coordination
issues between National Guard and Active Component forces, while addressing the apparent lack of
familiarity regarding DSC arrangements.22 Outside of
the military, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) produced a comprehensive post-Sandy assessment of DoD’s complex catastrophe planning. In their
2013 review of the response to Hurricane Sandy, the
GAO noted that “the roles and responsibilities of the
dual status commander, joint coordinating element,
and defense coordinating officer were unclear.”23 According to the report, this issue and others created
confusion among the responding military forces that
hindered the DSC’s ability to establish unity of effort,
which is the principal intent of the DSC arrangement
during such missions.
The 2013 report affirms what the GAO previously reported in 2012 prior to Sandy: There is a lack of
sufficient DSC policies and procedures that leads to
questions and confusion during certain operational
situations employing DSC architecture.24 Our Sandy
monograph notes the insufficiencies of the military
responses to Hurricane Sandy in New York.25 As part
of this study, we provided a series of strategic, operational, tactical, legislative, and policy-specific recom-
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mendations for consideration. Among the strategic
and operational recommendations, we suggest:
1. Strategic changes to future DSCA operations
through eliminating the Joint Coordinating Element
(JCE), which was placed in command over the NY
and NJ DSC and caused command and control issues.
To further improve coordination, we also suggested
appointing a Defense Coordinating Officer in Charge
(DCOIC) when more than one Defense Coordinating
Officer (DCO) is involved in a state response, as we
saw in Sandy.
2. A predetermined Active Component force integration period when using a DSC, especially during a
limited-notice event like a hurricane.
3. A mechanism similar to one in the Joint Staff Execution Order (EXORD)26 for authorizing the DSC to
assume tactical control of Active Component forces in
his/her area of operational responsibility (AOR)27 in
order to promote unified efforts.
From a policy and legislative perspective, we
argue for several changes:
1. Revise the current immediate response authority
policy, including revising and clarifying the definition
of “civil authority.”
2. Expansion of 10 U.S.C. § 12304a28 to include specific circumstances when the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve
can be sourced for support during a disaster response.
3. Revision of 32 U.S.C. § 502f29 with more restrictive operational triggering criteria for civil support
operations in order to avoid further abuses of this
authority.
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These recommendations, in addition to others
noted in the Sandy monograph, illustrate the range of
complexities involved in not only DSC-led response
operations, but the larger DSCA and National Guard
support operational landscape. Specifically to the argument here, the fluidity and uncertainty of DSC missions lends itself well to applying process improvement methods to enhance future missions. Using
some of the recommendations noted in our previous
case study, we demonstrate how process improvement can be used to incorporate the recommendations and generate noted improvements in future
DSC-led missions.
DUAL STATUS COMMANDERS:
SUPPORT FOR NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS
Hurricane Sandy gave us an opportunity to test
the DSC arrangement during a no-notice/limited
notice incident in support of civil authorities. While
some successes were evident, we believe there is room
for improvement in the way the military executes
DSCA operations under the DSC arrangement. In
addition to its adoption as the usual and customary
disaster response command arrangement via the 2012
NDAA, many senior military commanders publically
support the DSC concept. During the Sandy response,
Generals Charles Jacoby and Frank Grass, NORTHCOM Commander and Chief of the National Guard
Bureau (NGB), respectively, affirmed this in an article
following the Sandy response:
While this inaugural use of Dual-Status Commanders
wasn’t flawless, in the end we can say with conviction
that the concept works. It is simply the best command
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and control construct that exists for responding effectively and efficiently to complex disasters, because it
can bring the full weight of the DoD response to the
worst man-made or natural disasters while maintaining the authority of state and local governments.30

As the Chief of the NGB during the response to
Hurricane Katrina, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum
(USA, Ret.), along with Lieutenant Colonel Kerry McIntyre (USA, Ret.) of the Maryland Army National
Guard, noted the benefits of the DSC arrangement
compared with the traditional parallel model of command and control in which state National Guard and
Active Component forces operate simultaneously but
under separate commands. In their 2012 study based
largely on personal experience during Katrina which
was published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI),
the authors contended that the operational processes
governing the military responses under a DSC work,
but need to be improved:
Dual status command works. It should be the rule, not
the exception; and better methods must be developed
for placing useful military capabilities under dual status command, when requested and if available, for
homeland response.31

Based on the 2012 NDAA legislation and the endorsement of many senior military and DoD leaders,
the DSC construct will remain a central focus of current and future efforts to improve domestic response
capabilities of the U.S. military. There is a need, then,
to mature this command construct in order to attain
and maintain the level of proficiency and effectiveness expected in future response missions. However,
improving such a complex mission capability under a
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seldom-used command arrangement is quite literally
easier said than done.
Simultaneous DSCA and National Guard support
of state civil authorities occurs within a complex decisionmaking environment that must integrate legal,
political, financial, and bureaucratic considerations
into nearly every command decision. We can continue
to write and publish policies and laws in the hopes
that our commanders will consider each appropriately prior to making command decisions during uncertain situations. However, disaster operations often
require a sense of urgency in which bureaucracy only
serves as a hindrance. In these cases, policies, and in
some cases law, tend to be ignored, marginalized, or
simply forgotten. It is a rare commander who will delay a needed operational decision in order to consult
a manual or other lengthy reference publication. In
light of this, what we need is a tool applicable to the
urgency and complexity of no-notice/limited-notice
operations that still offers commanders a valuable
utility. Such a tool will distill the labyrinth of policies,
procedures, doctrine, and law into a simplified map
of mission-essential tasks worthy of the commander’s
consideration. This can be achieved through the application of process improvement strategies. Using
process improvement, we can build such a tool that
provides commanders with the information necessary
to ensure deference to the necessary laws and policies
governing military civil support missions without sacrificing speed, efficiency, effectiveness, or urgency.
Why Process Improvement?
Process improvement is “a program of activities
designed to improve the performance and maturity
of an organization’s processes, and the results of such
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a program.”32 Process improvement advocates argue
that the quality of a product or service is proportional
to the quality of the process.33 In the most basic sense,
process improvement offers users a structured approach to move from ad hoc and immature processes
to disciplined, mature processes and enhanced performance. In order to mature processes and improve
product or service delivery, process improvement
strategies emphasize identification and performance
of consistent practices deemed essential to providing
quality products or services. Business organizations
that employ process improvement techniques do so
in order to limit time spent performing unnecessary
or wasteful practices, while ensuring essential tasks
or practices are not only performed, but consistently
and predictably repeated. Through the diagnosis and
assessment of critical practices, process improvement
is a modification for most business organizations. By
identifying wasteful practices for removal, and essential tasks for consistency and repeatability, businesses are better able to improve the quality of their
services and product delivery. Companies including
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, IBM, Booz Allen
Hamilton, Federal Express (FedEx), and other industry leaders employ process improvement methods
as a way to enhance product and service delivery.34
As such, there are several examples of the benefits
of process improvement to support our argument.
The next section offers a brief example of how FedEx
used process improvement techniques to solve a service delivery issue and improve overall operational
performance. This example is relevant to the current
argument because it illustrates how an operationallyoriented service provider was able to apply similar
concepts and techniques as presented in this analysis
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to improve a critical operational function and mature
its delivery capabilities. While the circumstances and
specifics are different, we believe this offers support to
our argument and its potential application to military
operations.
FedEx and Process Improvement.
According to a senior executive at FedEx, one of
the company’s top business priorities is to “always
seek to improve our processes.”35 As a leader in global
package delivery services, the complexities of FedEx’s
day-to-day operations rival any in the service delivery industry. As a result, the company regularly looks
for ways to maintain or improve its market share by
improving processes and overall performance. FedEx
employs a cadre of professional analysts whose primary role is to diagnose processes by identifying areas
of weakness or inefficiency, as well as best practices.
These analysts then apply a range of process improvement strategies to re-engineer critical processes aimed
at improving efficiency and effectiveness of their
parcel services.
In 2007, for example, FedEx analysts noted a sharp
rise in service demand along with a growing trend
among customers for greater access to package tracking and location services. After providing improved
tracking capabilities, FedEx noted an increase in customer complaints regarding delivery delays, as their
customers were able to see real-time status updates including arrival and departure times in various sorting
facilities located along a shipment route. What was
originally intended to be an enhancement in customer
satisfaction resulted in a growing dissatisfaction over
perceived delays and inefficiencies in package de-
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livery times. In order to meet evolving customer demands for speed and efficiency, while also noting an
insufficient data tracking capability, FedEx used process improvement methods to diagnose and enhance
their critical sorting processes. In doing so, FedEx
identified inefficiencies in its parcel tracking system
related to increased volume and the system’s inability
to effectively service growing requirements. As a solution, the company deployed a new internal operating
system to enhance parcel tracking and data processing
at its many sorting facilities. This improved operating
system enhanced FedEx’s receiving and sorting processes for standard ground packages (nonpriority). As
a result of this process improvement approach to meet
a growing customer demand, FedEx Ground lowered
its average parcel delivery time in over half of its network by nearly 24 hours over a 3-year period.36
Process Improvement in the Department
of Defense.
FedEx is just one example of the many companies
and organizations worldwide that employ process improvement strategies as a way to improve their business practices, operations, and profitability. While the
private sector uses process improvement as a means
to generate profit, process improvement can—and
does—provide a benefit to government services as
well. As the largest Federal department in terms of
budget and personnel,37 DoD regularly requires improvement to its various processes and programs.
As such, process improvement is not foreign to DoD.
Military personnel in certain occupational specialties
are familiar with process improvement methods and
techniques including Lean Six Sigma (LSS) and Ca-
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pability Maturity Models-Integrated (CMMI), among
others. Recognizing the importance and utility of these
methods, DoD, in 2007, established the Office of Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) and LSS within
the Office of Business Transformation and housed it
under Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. CPI/
LSS’ primary mission is to ensure the integration of
process improvement methods into current business
operations within DoD.38 By integrating process improvement methods into defense business operations,
DoD has a vehicle for business process optimization
through the identification and reduction of wasteful
practices. Process improvement methods such as LSS
and CMMI provide DoD with the necessary techniques to diagnose and improve critical business processes and meet mission requirements. As such, these
techniques are used throughout DoD in a variety of
capacities, albeit mostly administrative in nature.
Other process improvement-based assessment
practices like the Manager’s Internal Control Program,
the Commander’s Evaluation Program, and similar
continuous improvement approaches are regularly
applied to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of business practices within DoD. Given the ongoing application of process improvement techniques
to enhance administrative elements of DoD, as well
as the proven application to private sector operations
like FedEx, we argue that these same principles can be
used to mature military operations. With a degree of
creativity and flexibility, DoD can apply these proven
techniques to their operational environment as a way
to measure current performance and improve future
performance. In order to identify the best process improvement technique for application to the complexities of military civil support operations, it is necessary
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to understand the key elements of process improvement and its many alternative approaches.
Key Elements of Process Improvement.
Since there are several process improvement alternatives—each with a specific concentration—it is helpful to discuss some of the most common approaches
and the potential application to military operations.
Early process improvement literature dates back to
the 1930s and the work of Walter Shewhart. Shewhart,
whose work emphasized quality control principles,
is credited with creating the “Plan Do Check Act”
concept—or the Shewhart Cycle—which is now used
throughout managerial mediums as a simple means
for improving procedures.39 Shewhart’s early work
was expanded by modern process improvement scholars and has since evolved into a research area casting a
wide scope across the performance management and
engineering fields alike. Unlike performance management approaches that are focused on achieving predetermined measurable results or outcomes, process
improvement—in contrast—emphasizes adherence to
established steps or procedures to improve the quality
of a product or service.40 In other words, “the quality of
a system or product is highly influenced by the quality of the process used to develop and maintain it.”41
There are several methods for process improvement
that have been applied to organizations seeking to improve the delivery of their products and/or services.
Some of the more commonly used approaches include
Total Quality Management,42 Lean,43 Six Sigma,44 the
IDEAL Model,45 and maturity models.46
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Table 1 presents some common process improvement methods in terms of the focus area, purpose,
and features of the method. Each alternative brings a
unique focus and approach to improving processes.
Despite their differences, the strategies offer users a
structured method to improve their processes, regardless of functional area. Some of the model-based
strategies, like maturity models, facilitate the consolidation of best practices into a single medium for all
users. Having a model that articulates user-defined
best practices or essential tasks helps organizations
work smarter, not harder, and with improved consistency. So, the applied benefit of process improvement
is potentially significant. However, most of the above
approaches are grounded in software engineering and
other well-defined practices and are therefore best
suited for the inherent predictability of such functions.
This makes adapting process improvement concepts
and techniques challenging for the operational uncertainty and fluidity of military operations. Despite
these challenges, we argue that process improvement
can be adapted for military operations and result in
tangible enhancements.
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Process Improvement Alternatives
Method

Total Quality
Management

Lean

Six Sigma

IDEAL

Maturity
Models

-Management
practices

-Production
optimization
(manufacturing)

-Process
variability
(minimize)

-Process
definitions
and activities

-Best
practices

Purpose

-Continuous
improvement of
products/services

-Eliminate
“waste” and
enhance
productivity

-Remove defects
-Increase
repeatability/
parity

-Program
improvement

-Process
mapping

Feature(s)

-Defined
requirements and
responsibilities

-Value driven
practices

-Quantifiable
performance
targets

-Cyclical
process of
key activities

-Capability
/Target
profiles

Focus Area

Table 1. Variations in Process Improvement.
Adapting Process Improvement for
Operational Contexts.
The use of DSCs during Hurricane Sandy highlighted the issues, gaps, and opportunities for improvement with regard to DSC arrangements during
no-notice/limited-noticed incidents. There is an opportunity to learn from events like Hurricane Sandy
and improve our knowledge and understanding of
DSC structures and this critical mission-enhancing
capability. Using process improvement techniques to
guide these efforts is a unique approach worth considering. Given the systems and software engineering
genesis of process improvement techniques, it is necessary to adapt them somewhat in order to maximize

23

the benefit when applied to a less-structured operational context such as a DSCA mission.
The dynamic nature of DSCA operations requires
mature capabilities representing information sharing,
shared situational awareness, and social interaction;
each of which must occur through both linear and
vertical command hierarchies. The heterogeneous
DSC construct involves several contributing elements,
echelons, agencies, departments, and organizations
in both state and federal operational chains of command. This requires an agile, coordinated response
incorporating each entity and its respective capabilities. The DSC arrangement provides a command and
coordination mechanism designed to help improve
coordination processes across the federal-state authority boundary. Through enhanced information and
knowledge sharing under the DSC construct, military
commanders can achieve greater management effectiveness and governance. As a result, joint military
operations seek to attain a network-centric and agile
force structure during complex scenarios. The DSC
construct is designed to facilitate such network-centric, agile operations involving multiple departments,
agencies, and response organizations.
Knowing the complexities involved with military
operations, doctrine argues for a mission command
approach to leadership.47 This approach, more reflective of the modern, post-Vietnam era military, values
decentralized control and empowering small unit
leaders. Through this approach, commanders can articulate what needs to be done to subordinates while
leaving the how, or the tactical level decisionmaking,
up to the small unit leader. This approach also serves
to minimize bureaucratic and procedural obstacles
and offers the needed autonomy and flexibility for
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subordinate leaders to make split-second decisions
without the constant need for approval from higher
authority. While flexibility and agility are necessary
ingredients for speed and effectiveness, military civil
support operations often encounter challenges that
process improvement techniques can help address.
As discussed previously, most process improvement approaches are designed to assess and improve
the “assembly line” and predictable systems associated with software and systems engineering. These
approaches focus on the identification of wasteful
practices and direct their removal in order to improve
system performance. The concept suggests that small
changes or improvements in larger processes have a
cascading effect on each subsequent process thereafter. This results in larger changes or improvements
to predictable outcomes. Military operations of any
kind are rarely predictable. While situations and scenarios can be anticipated with some accuracy, there is
always a degree of uncertainty. As such, some process
improvement techniques provide little utility for most
military operations where flexibility and improvisation are highly valued. However, if we instead shift
the focus of our improvement efforts to mapping
the relevant processes and essential tasks associated,
we can generate significant improvements in overall
operational efficiency.
BUILDING A PROCESS MODEL FOR
DSCA OPERATIONS
Military operations, especially DSCA missions,
are unpredictable. The fluidity of an operational environment mandates flexibility, adaptation to the
environment, and improvisation. With the inherent
challenges in DSC-led DSCA operations, developing
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a process model as a tool to represent essential tasks
and articulate relevant operational considerations
would be a significant improvement. Since we know
the DSC construct will be used again in future disaster response operations, we need to continue to learn
from past operations and implement lessons learned.
A DSC-led DSCA operation offers a semi-structured
organizational arrangement to overcome some of the
complexities associated with a multiauthority decision environment. Because of the organizational structure, there are repeatable tasks associated with a DSC,
which, if performed consistently, will enhance operational performance in future missions. Improving
the critical processes to execute DSC-led operations
would further enhance the stability and predictability of interorganizational command, control, and coordination, and the ability of commanders to address
a variety of environmental contingencies. With so
many considerations and potential areas of challenge,
identifying and documenting essential tasks for inclusion in a process model is a useful exercise aimed at
improving complex military operational processes.
Mission Essential Tasks and Process Mapping.
To determine what is necessary for a DSC-led
JTF—in either state or federal status—to function at its
highest potential level of operational maturity during
a disaster response, we must identify those essential
tasks that must be performed during the conduct of
the response. Drawing from established DoD concepts, identifying and listing essential tasks for consideration is similar to developing a Mission Essential
Task List (METL). In operational contexts, METLs are
tools that help commanders prioritize training activi-
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ties in preparation for combat operations. As described
in the DoD METL Development Handbook, the premise centers on the identification of tasks that must be
prioritized and performed in order to maximize the
likelihood of accomplishing a given mission.48 Mission
essential tasks are activities that, when performed, are
linked with successful outcomes. Multiple mission essential tasks form a METL. In other words, a mission
essential task is a critical function that must occur in
order to ensure completion of a particular mission.
While DSCA is a recognized mission capability of
the U.S. military, few military units have core DSCA
responsibilities. Beyond this, there are currently no
DSCA-specific tasks listed in any joint METL within
DoD.49 Since DSCA is a lower-level mission capability
and priority for DoD, there is no basis from which we
can develop such METLs. However, this is an important consideration for improving future civil support
operations; especially those combined state and federal missions using the DSC arrangement. The development of a DSCA or DSC-specific process model is an
approach worth considering for future improvement
efforts.
In order to determine appropriate METLs for inclusion in a process model, model creators seek industry or subject matter experts (SME) to provide input
and recommendations through personal interviews
and/or focus groups. SMEs help to identify the characteristics of effective processes and are therefore
critical to the creation of a process model of this kind.
As a DoD-endorsed and funded method of process
improvement, a maturity model provides us with the
ideal architecture to list DSC-specific METLs deemed
necessary for a DSCA operation under a DSC. As opposed to other process improvement strategies gener-
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ally focused on achieving quantifiable business goals
and objectives, maturity models emphasize individual
task performance within structured levels as a means
to generate comprehensive enhancement. With so
many uncertainties, a one-size-fits-all approach is not
suitable for DSCA. Due to the variations in scenarios
during disaster response, there can be no single quantifiable measure of success applicable to all support
operations. Therefore, the ideal process improvement
strategy is one that identifies critical tasks for completion and focuses on the structured performance of
such tasks. Maturity models offer commanders exactly that: a structured way of identifying, listing, and
guiding the performance of critical tasks without the
need to identify and work toward quantifiable and
often irrelevant objectives.
Since maturity models emphasize specific practices
or essential tasks, this process improvement strategy
provides commanders with a singular comprehensive
tool to view the complexities and the systematic interrelationships of a Federal JTF operation. The ability
to view these tasks in a single tool gives commanders the benefit of having multiple task considerations
in one location. Using a maturity model approach,
we can build a DSC-led Federal JTF METL that will
help commanders make more informed decisions by
providing a structured list of tasks for consideration
during the conduct of operations. In order to demonstrate the utility of such a tool, we use some of the proposed recommendations in our Sandy monograph as
examples for guiding the development of simplified
maturity models structured specifically for a DSC-led
Federal JTF. The next section of this monograph uses
three recommendations from our Sandy case study
as examples to demonstrate the application of a basic
maturity model for enhancing military operations.
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RECOMMENDED PROCESS AND EXAMPLES
In order to scope, design, and populate a usable
maturity model, developers first need to determine
the focus or purpose of the model. For the purposes
of this discussion, we explain the development of a
model scoped specifically to DSC-led Federal JTF processes. Once the scope has been determined, model
developers need to collect data for the eventual design and population of the model. Suggested data
collection methods include individual interviews and
focus group interviews.50 In this example, developers
must identify subject matter experts in DSC-led Federal JTF operations and request interviews and/or
focus groups. Because maturity models contain specific practices determined to be critical for mature processes, interviews should include questions designed
to illicit discussion and identification of essential task
requirements during the conduct of DSC-led response
operations. The interviewer, in relation to the intended
utility of the model, determines the type, order, and
content of these questions. After completing the interviews, developers must analyze the interview data
in order to design and populate the maturity model
according to SME input.
Most maturity models use a progressive scale—e.g.,
1-5—to represent increasing levels of maturity. Maturity levels should be labeled with a short, descriptive
term relevant to the collection of tasks contained in
the given level. Some models, such as CMMI models,
also include process areas, or clusters of related practices, within each maturity level to add structure to
more complex representations. After determining the
appropriate number of maturity levels and whether
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to include process areas, developers need to populate
the model with SME input contained in the interview
data. Identification and placement of essential tasks
within the model initially depends on the developer’s
logic and rationale (content and placement is later validated by SME assessment with revisions performed
as needed). If omitting process areas from the model,
developers group the tasks so that they are representative of a sequenced, progressive process within each
maturity level. After populating each maturity level
and making revisions as needed based on SME input,
the model can be tested in order to determine its suitability for future deployment.
To provide tangible examples of such a model, we
used recommendations from our previous SSI case
study on Hurricane Sandy to develop three processspecific maturity models. The three simplified maturity models each represent a structured list of mission
essential task considerations in a consolidated format.
Since these are recommendations contained in our case
study, they are not actual processes currently practiced by the U.S. military. Therefore, source data is not
available to create an accurate model that represents
these processes. The models are hypothetical depictions of simplified maturity models designed to provide examples to support our discussion. The intent is
to present process improvement concepts as an option
for consideration in future operational enhancement
efforts. Therefore, these models are not representative
of the necessary size and scope otherwise required to
fully represent the complexities of a DSC-led Federal
JTF and its associated support operations. Rather,
they illustrate how a simplified maturity model can
be developed and used to guide the performance of
singular tasks during the conduct of DSC-led State
and Federal military support operations.
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By using a maturity model structure containing
documented best practices or essential tasks, commanders can improve operational maturity by progressing from an undefined, ad hoc process to a welldefined, mature process. In addition, maturity models
can be used as a metric of performance, or a rubric of
sorts, for post-operation evaluations and after-action
reporting. Using the model as a guide, commanders
and their staffs can assess their performance by determining which tasks were or were not performed. This
will serve as a metric that will provide a structured
improvement plan through noting which practices
were not performed. Regardless of intended application, the basic design and concept of a maturity model
offers military units a useful method of mapping complex processes and increasing operational maturity.
Maturity Model Example 1: Designate a Defense
Coordinating Officer in Charge.
Using basic tenets of process improvement techniques (process mapping, metric identification, etc.),
we can develop a simplified maturity model with
sequenced essential task considerations representing
the Defense Coordinating Officer in Charge (DCOIC)
assignment and activation process.51 Table 2 illustrates what this model might look like during a federally declared disaster (multistate or severe impact)
where a DSC-led Federal JTF has been or will soon
be established and multiple DCOs are involved (as in
Hurricane Sandy). While such tasks may be accomplished without the aid of a model, developing and
maintaining a defined tool of this kind will ensure that
commanders and other key personnel possess a structured list of the essential tasks needed to activate and
effectively employ a DCOIC.
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Level 1—Reactive

Level 2—Integrated

Level 3—Collaborative

R1: Identify and activate
regional DCOs

I1: Locate the Joint Field Office
(JFO) and Federal Coordinating
Officer (FCO)

C1: DCO is integrated into State and
Federal processes for requesting
DoD Support

R2: Determine DCO
geographical areas of
responsibility

I2: Determine DCO hierarchy
by 1) rank seniority or 2) billet
seniority

C2: Deploy regional DCOs/
Departments of Civil Engineering
(DCE) to pre-determined locations

R3: Establish DCE staff section
for each DCO

I3: Designate a DCOIC

C3: Establish communications link
between regional DCOs, DSC JTF,
and DCOIC Information Operations
Technology (IOT) Mission
Assignment (MA)

R4: Identify location for
deployment of DCO/E staff
sections

I4: Communicate DCOIC
designation to DCO/E staff
sections and DSC-led Federal
JTF

C4: DCO/E located with key
interagency organizations that they
support, i.e. FEMA

Table 2. DCOIC Deployment Maturity Model.
The utility of the model is such that it provides a
guided progression of activities from a reactive level
of maturity—unplanned and ad hoc—to a collaborative maturity level. The different levels of maturity
(Reactive, Integrated, Collaborative), suggest how the
process can evolve from an ad hoc process to a unified process where necessary personnel, units, agencies, and organizations unify their efforts in order to
achieve a common goal. In the example below, the
military end-user achieves a collaborative maturity
level 3 (most mature) by performing and documenting
all listed tasks in Levels 1, 2, and 3. While the tasks do
not necessarily have to be performed in order, Level 3
tasks cannot be performed without first accomplishing those tasks listed in Levels 1 and 2. (Users employ
the same maturity progression process described in
Table 2 for all examples contained in this monograph).
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Maturity Model Example 2: Establish an Initial
Title 10 Integration Period.
In another example of maturity model application
related to our Sandy case study recommendations, we
model the essential task considerations needed to integrate the Armed Forces into the beginning stages of
disaster response operations under a DSC-led Federal
JTF.52 While understandably problematic considering
the current tiered national response system described
in the National Response Framework (NRF), this recommendation provides a DSC with a defined authority to request Title 10 forces prior to soliciting Title 32
support, and only for a predetermined period of 72
hours following the DSC’s activation to remain consistent with current policy associated with similar actions
under Immediate Response Authority.53 Table 3 illustrates the conceptual model for preliminary Armed
Forces integration under a DSC-led Federal JTF. This
process is permitted up to 72 hours after DSC activation. The normal Request For Assistance (RFA) process begins at the conclusion of the proposed 72-hour
integration period.
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Level 1—Reactive

Level 2—Integrated

Level 3—Collaborative

R1: DCO/DCOIC identifies
and prioritizes civil authority
requests for assistance (RFA)
based on urgency of need,
severity, and extent of required
capability

I1: Establish communications
link between DSC-led Federal
JTF, DCO/DCOIC, and
selected units of the Armed
Forces for pending support

C1: DSC-led Federal JTF
assumes tactical control
of Armed Forces units and
coordinates support activities

R2: Assess RFAs and flag
specific tasks for DoD support

I2: DCO/DCOIC confirms
capability requirements with
requesting lead Federal civil
authority

C2: DSC-led Federal JTF assigns
forces missions based on
RFAs though National Incident
Management System process

R3: Coordinate with DSCled Federal JTF to determine
appropriate DoD resources to
fulfill RFAs

I3: SECDEF deploys units of
the Armed Forces to DSC-led
Federal JTF

C3: DSC-led Federal JTF
integrates Title 10 forces into
mission command structure
and missions according to
civilian priorities

Table 3. Temporary Title 10 Integration
Maturity Model.
Maturity Model Example 3: Designate and
Deploy a Title 10 Adaptive Task Force.
Similar to the proposed initial Title 10 integration
period discussed earlier, we also proposed the identification and inclusion of a Federal adaptive task force
(A-TF) during future DSC-led support operations.54
The proposed A-TF, like the Title 10 integration period, is intended to minimize bureaucratic restrictions
and maximize the DSC’s decisionmaking flexibility.
Using the actions of Task Force (TF) Pump during
Sandy as an example, we recommend designating—
where needed and appropriate—a single Federal TF
to perform a defined set of missions based on capability requirements determined by the DSC-led Federal
JTF, DCO, and requesting lead Federal civil authori-
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ties. In Sandy, TF Pump provided the NY DSC with
an easily identifiable unit with a focused capability (dewatering). TF Pump received most mission assignments related to dewatering in and around New
York City during the Sandy response. According to
the NY DSC, TF Pump offered a single decision point
for dewatering missions that simplified matters and
resulted in quicker response. The A-TF simply codifies this ad hoc model used during Sandy as a default
requirement during future DSC response efforts. The
maturity model for assigning and deploying an A-TF
is illustrated in Table 4.
Level 1—Reactive

Level 2—Integrated

Level 3—Collaborative

I1: NORTHCOM identifies/
designates DSC-led Federal JTF
and provides forces to JTF

C1: DSC-led Federal
JTF task organizes
military forces based on
mission analysis, using
either a functional or
geographical model for
subordinate JTF/TFs

R2: DSC-led Federal JTF
communicates needed mission
capability to NORTHCOM

I2: NORTHCOM issues prepare
to deploy orders for requested
military forces

C2: DSC-led Federal JTF
integrates and activates
A-TF and assumes
tactical control of TF
within AOR; assigns
missions as needed

R3: DSC-led Federal JTF assesses
response requirement against
available force capability in order to
determine suitable unit

I3: DSC-led Federal JTF either
deploys internal capability
against a requirement or
requests additional capability

R1: Federal DCO coordinates with
lead Federal civil authorities, FEMA,
to identify major mission capability
(ex. Dewatering)

Table 4. Title 10 Task Force
Deployment Maturity Model.
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CONCLUSION
The above models, although simplistic, offer an
alternative method to plan for and execute military
civil support operations under the DSC arrangement.
Developing METLs is a familiar practice for most military planners and despite their similarities, maturity
models are not. Due to the intricacy and uncertainty in
most DSCA operations, scripting a mission from beginning to end is unrealistic as requirements and situations often change. Rather than attempting to plan
for every possible scenario and burying themselves
in detailed plans and orders, commanders and their
staffs should instead emphasize the identification and
execution of mission-essential tasks as a method for
gaining operational maturity. As we have demonstrated, process improvement strategies can provide an alternative approach to enhancing performance during
the uncertainty of DSCA response missions. By generating METLs and graphically depicting them in maturity models like the examples above, commanders
can reference these tools as guides to effective practice
without sacrificing decision-making flexibility.
As discussed, process improvement methods are
used extensively in nonoperational DoD business,
and in many cases as a universal standard of performance or practice. Process improvement in general
has proven to be effective in generating enhancements
and contributions to DoD. With such extensive application and utility in DoD business operations, process improvement can and should be considered as a
guided method for improving operational maturity as
well. The DSC-led DSCA response to Hurricane Sandy demonstrated some of the areas in which process
improvement could have been applied.
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While most process improvement strategies are
ill-suited to the complexities of DSCA and DSC-led
operations for reasons discussed, the maturity model
concept offers a different approach to improve future
mission execution. In order to achieve more mature
DSCA operations under the DSC arrangement, we
need mechanisms in place to help commanders and
their staffs manipulate—to the extent possible—the
various uncertainties represented in the complex decision environment present in most DSCA scenarios.
The maturity model concept provides commanders
with a method of limiting these uncertainties through
a framework that identifies, standardizes, and codifies
mission essential tasks in a DSC-led response environment. So, while DSCA operations cannot be scripted,
they can be more structured and defined than they
are currently. The maturity model concept provides
a semi-structured framework for improving future
DSCA mission execution. Therefore, DoD should
consider the concepts addressed in this monograph
and use them as a basis for maturity model development for future DSCA operations. These models can
be presented as supplemental material in an appendix
to various DoD reference publications, doctrine, directives, and guidance documents relevant to the DSCA
mission capability. DoD should leverage the lessons
learned from Hurricane Sandy and determine ways to
integrate maturity model concepts into future DSCA
and DSC training and real-world operations.
To maintain operational effectiveness, DoD must
ensure its ability to continually adapt to changing
policy and legislation—such as the DSC initiative—
without sacrificing performance during domestic civil
support operations. The DSC response to Hurricane
Sandy was only the first attempt to use this unique

37

coordination mechanism in response to a domestic disaster. There are numerous opportunities for improvement. Emphasizing task performance and processes is
the proper approach to improve upon the challenges
noted during Sandy. Process improvement strategies
provide the foundation for generating such improvements and should be integrated into future dual status
commander DSCA operations. Doing so will result in
improved coordination between the National Guard
and Federal military forces during disaster response,
ultimately leading to more lives saved, fewer properties lost, and less suffering during the next significant
incident requiring military support.
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